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The purpose of this article is to outline the principal responses adopted within the United King-
dom to the recent financial crises beginning with the contraction in liquidity on inter-bank markets
in August 2007. Earlier papers are referred to following the public acquisition of Northern Rock,
including relevant House of Commons reports, and later House of Lords studies, although this
article focuses specifically on the more recent recommendations contained in the important Turner
Review, the United Kingdom Treasury White Paper on Reforming Financial Markets, and the
Walker Review on Corporate Governance in the financial area as well as the structure and content
of Banking Act 2009 and the government's most recent Financial Services Act 2010. The objec-
tive is to identify the key components within the emerging U.K response, as well as residual gaps
and omissions which study may be of interest and use to policy reformers, legislators, practitioners,
and other interested parties in other parts of the world.
The global financial crisis that began in summer 2007 has continued to wreak devastat-
ing loss and damage across all markets, all economies, and all countries.' An initial liquid-
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ity contraction in the financial markets was transformed into a full solvency crisis
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, which was a precursor
to the most savage global recession since the Great Depression during the 1930s. This
crisis was almost wholly unpredicted and led to a massive collapse in growth and invest-
ment across the world. Leading emerging markets were not immune as any possible
decoupling or separation evaporated. It was not until the end of the second quarter of
2009 that some stabilization in the financial sector was detected. Any full recovery within
the real economy would be postponed until 2010 or later.
A large number of official, technical, and private papers and commentaries have since
been issued on the causes and failures that led to the collapse. An even more substantial
number of recommendations for corrective action and reform have been brought forward
to prevent any future recurrence. The core challenge nevertheless remains to identify the
correct causes and fault, to ensure that the necessary lessons are learned, and the most
appropriative corrective action taken. This objective necessarily includes many more spe-
cifically technical supervisory and regulatory amendments, although a number of more
difficult substantive policy issues also remain to be resolved in certain key areas concerned.
The purpose of this paper is to consider some of the more significant documents issued
in the United Kingdom following the crisis and to attempt to identify the more important
policy issues raised. An influential paper was produced by Lord Adair Turner, the new
Chairman of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), on The Global Banking Crisis in
March 2009,2 which was followed by a Treasury White Paper on Reforming Financial Mar-
kets in July 2009.3 Sir David Walker released his report on Corporate Governance in UK
Banks4 one week later with other financial stability institutional reforms within the Bank of
England coming into effect earlier in the year under the Banking Act 2009. The Banking
Act specifically established a new special resolution regime (SRR) for U.K. banks follow-
ing U.S. restructuring models and provided for the creation of a new Financial Stability
Committee within the Bank.5 The government also brought forward a proposal for a
further Financial Services Bill in November 2009.6 Whether this would come into effect
was to depend upon whether the labor administration, under Prime Minister Gordon
Brown, won a fourth term in office following the General Election in May 2010, although
the Financial Services Act 2010 was then quickly enacted on April 8, 2010. The key rec-
ommendations made within each of these documents are considered and the emerging
U.K. policy response assessed.
I. Financial Crisis
Reports of rising defaults on sub-prime mortgage accounts in the United States in 2006
and early 2007 led to an initial contraction in wholesale credit markets between summer
Regulatory Refom, in THE FuTruRE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 179 (lain MacNeil & Justin O'Brien eds.,
2010).
2. The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis, FIN. SERVICEs Aurn., Mar. 2009,
[hereinafter Turner Review].
3. HM Treasury, Reforming Financial Markets, 2009, Cm 7667 [hereinafter Reforming Financial Markets].
4. SIR DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN U.K. BANKS AND OTHER FINAN-
CIAL INDUSTRY ErTrnEs (2009) [hereinafter WALKER REVIEW].
5. HM Treasury, Banking Act 2009, § 1, 238.
6. This followed the Treasury White Paper, Reforning Financial Markets, supra note 3.
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2007 and summer 2008. Despite this, market tensions appeared to be manageable until
the shock losses revealed at Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, Lehman Brothers, and Ameri-
can International Group (AIG) in August and September 2008.7 The U.S. authorities
were able to salvage the mortgage agencies by bringing them into conservatorship and
AIG subsequently; although Lehman was forced to file for bankruptcy on September 15,
2008.8 This led to a collapse in financial stock prices across all major markets as the crisis
escalated from being liquidity to solvency based.9 Stock markets tumbled during the third
week of September and first week of October with little respite possible after the an-
nouncement of delayed agreement on the U.S. $700bn Troubled Asset Recovery Program
(TARP).1o This followed a period of unsightly disagreement and compromise within
Congress; with meaningful leadership also being absent within the European Union
(E.U.) and at the G7/G8 levels. It was only following the forced intervention by the
British government on the morning of Wednesday, October 8, 2008, that the rout in the
United Kingdom and European markets was halted.I1 This almost inspired intervention
was based on a combination of capital injections (recapitalization), extended liquidity sup-
port through the Bank of England's Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS), and government
supported three-year wholesale (legacy) guarantees.12 This combination of capital, liquid-
ity, and support guarantees subsequently became the basis for intervention in many other
countries.
A. NORTHERN ROCK
Within the United Kingdom, the first casualty from the crisis was Northern Rock
Bank.13 Northern Rock had only limited exposure to the U.S. sub-prime market of
around £75m, although its business model made it dependent on wholesale funding
through the U.K. inter-bank markets.14 Northern Rock had only 22.4% of retail cover
with the rest of its funding coming from securitization, covered bonds, and wholesale
borrowing, which disappeared with the contraction in wholesale lending.15 The bank was
forced to accept emergency funding from the Bank of England on September 14, 2007,
and after an untidy leak by reporters on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) of its
financial difficulties, its share price plummeted, which began the first run on a major U.K.
7. Walker, Credit Contraction, Financial Collapse and Global Recession, supra note 1, at 5-6; Walker, The Global
Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reform, supra note 1, at 88-190.
8. Walker, Credit Contraction, Financial Collapse and Global Recession, supra note 1, at 5-6; Walker, The Global
Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reform, supra note 1, at 88-190.
9. Walker, Credit Contraction, Financial Collapse and Global Recession, supra note 1, at 5-6; Walker, The Global
Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reform, supra note 1, at 88-190.
10. Walker, Credit Contraction, Financial Collapse and Global Recession, supra note 1, at 7-8; Walker, The Global
Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reform, supra note 1, at 191.
11. Walker, Credit Contraction, Financial Collapse and Global Recession, supra note 1, at 9; Walker, The Global
Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reform, supra note 1, at 192-94.
12. Walker, Credit Contraction, Financial Collapse and Global Recession, supra note 1, at 9; Walker, The Global
Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reform, supra note 1, at 192-94.
13. Walker, Credit Contraction, Financial Collapse and Global Recession, supra note 1, at 9; Walker, The Global
Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reform, supra note 1, at 192-94.
14. Walker, Credit Crisis-Regulatory and Financial Systems Reform, supra note 1, at 569; Walker, The Global
Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reform, supra note 1, at 192; Walker, Northern Rock Falls, supra note 1, at 4-5.
15. Walker, Credit Crisis-Regulatory and Financial Systems Reform, supra note 1, at 569; Walker, The Global
Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reform, supra note 1, at 192; Walker, Northern Rock Falls, supra note 1, at 4-5.
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bank since Overend Gurney in 1866.16 The Treasury was forced to make repeated state-
ments of assurance to the markets on September 17 and 20, 2007, and October 19, 2007.17
After an unsuccessful attempt to find a preferred private bidder (including by the Virgin
Group, Olivant, and a potential management buyout team), Northern Rock was brought
into public acquisition (nationalized) on February 17, 2008.18 The Banking (Special Pro-
visions) Act was taken through Parliament quickly, and enacted on February 21, 2008, to
facilitate the transfer.19 This was replaced by the permanent resolution provisions con-
tained in the Banking Act 2009 exactly one year later. 20 The former shareholders in
Northern Rock commenced an action against the government for inadequate compensa-
tion before Lord Justice Stanley Burnton, although the action was dismissed in court at
first instance, whose decision was upheld on appeal. 21
B. BRADFORD & BINGLEY
A second former building society, Bradford & Bingley, which had been converted into a
bank in 2000, had also to be nationalized on September 29, 2008.22 Its savings operations
and branches were sold to the Spanish bank, Santander, with the government assuming
responsibility for its £50bn mortgage book.23 Bradford & Bingley had been one of the
leading lenders in the higher risk buy-to-let and self-certification mortgage markets. An-
other building society, the Dunfermline, was later acquired by Nationwide Building Soci-
ety in March 2009, after losses suffered following the recession had unfolded with other
building societies mergers being forced through, including the Catholic & Chelsea,
Cheshire, Derbyshire, and Nationwide Building Societies. 24
C. BANK SUPPORT PACKAGE
Following the announcement of the U.K. government's recovery plan on October 8,
2008, each of the major U.K. banks was forced by the Treasury to recalculate their capital
needs over the weekend using extreme stress tests devised by the Financial Services Au-
thority (FSA).25 The government had promised up to £50bn in bank recapitalization,
although only around 937m was initially required, which was taken up by Lloyds RSB
(Y5bn), Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) (over £12bn), and Royal Bank of Scotland
16. Walker, Credit Crisis-Regulatory and Financial Systems Reform, supra note 1, at 569; Walker, The Global
Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reifrm, supra note 1, at 192; Walker, Northern Rock Falls, supra note 1, at 4-5.
17. Walker, Credit Crisis-Regulatory and Financial Systems Reform, supra note 1, at 569; Walker, The Global
Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reform, supra note 1, at 192; Walker, Northern Rock Falls, supra note .1, at 4-5.
18. Walker, Credit Crisis-Regulatory and Financial Systems Reform, supra note 1, at 569; Walker, The Global
Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reform, supra note 1, at 192; Walker, Northern Rock Falls, supra note 1, at 4-5.
19. Banking Special Provisions Act, 2008, c.2 (Eng.).
20. Walker, Credit Crisis-Regulatory and Financial Systems Reform, supra note 1, at 569; Walker, The Global
Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reform, supra note 1, at 192; Walker, Northern Rock Falls, supra note 1, at 4-5.
21. SRM Global Master Fund LP v. Con'rs of Her Majesty's Treasury, (2009) No. CO/4342/4715/
4351/2008, (High Ct. ofJustice, Divisional Ct.) (Q.B.); see generally George A. Walker, Northern Rock Com-
pensation, 2(4) BANKERS' L. 43-45 (2009).
22. Walker, Credit Contraction, Financial Collapse and Global Recession, supra note 1, at 6-7.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 9.
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(RBS) (over £19bn).26 The funds were made available through the Bank Recapitalization
Fund (BRF), with the government acquiring twelve percent preference shares (in contrast
to the six percent imposed in the United States).27 The other major banks were able to
raise capital from the markets. The government had earlier approved the separate acquisi-
tion of HBOS by Lloyds before the bank recapitalization plan was announced in October
2008, with special competition dispensation having to be provided as the new Lloyds
Banking Group (LBG) had acquired over thirty-two percent of the market in excess of the
twenty-eight percent maximum permitted.28 Some argued that the acquisition agreed to
prior to the recapitalization should not have been allowed to proceed following the mak-
ing available of additional capital through the government scheme in October. This ac-
quisition was no longer necessary and appropriate, although the government insisted that
HBOS may still not have been able to survive by itself and that this was a commercial
decision.
D. SECOND SUPPORT PACKAGE
With the onset of the global recession, further losses were suffered by the U.K. major
banks, which forced the government to announce a second support package in January
2009.29 This announcement followed discussions on January 17-18, 2009, concerning the
possible establishment of an asset purchase scheme based on the U.S. TARP model.30
Rather than follow the U.S. example, it was decided to establish an insurance scheme that
would limit the losses on the highest risk distressed assets on the banks' balance sheets.3'
This scheme was referred to at the insistence of the authorities as a "work-out," rather
than a second "bail-out," in the press.32 The new Asset Protection Scheme (ASP) came
into effect on February 26, 2009, with the Treasury providing credit loss protection on
one or more portfolios of defined assets in excess of an agreed "first loss" amount, with
ninety percent of the credit losses in excess of this amount being covered and institutions
assuming liability for the remaining ten percent of loss. 33
E. POLmIcAL AND PARLIAMENTARY RESPONSE
A number of official documents have been published in the United Kingdom in re-
sponse to the crisis over the last two years in addition to the Turner Review, Walker
Review, and Treasury White Paper. These parallel similar United States investigations,
papers, and legislative reform packages. 34 These documents include a series of papers by
26. Id.
27. Press Release, HM Treasury, Treasury Statement on Financial Support to the Banking Industry (Oct.
13, 2008), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.U.K/pressJ105-08.htm.
28. Walker, Credit Contraction, Financial Collapse and Global Recession, supra note 1, at 7.
29. Walker, The Global Credit Crisis and Regulatory Reform, supra note 1, at 194.
30. Id.
31. Larry Elliot, Q&A: the Latest Bank Bail-Out, GuAnDuu, NEws, Jan. 19, 2009, available at http:/
www.guardian.co.U.K/business/2009/jan/19/bank-bailout-guide.
32. HM Treasury, The Asset Protection Scheme, http-//www.hm-treasury.gov.U.K/apa-aps.htm.
33. Id.
34. On U.S. reforms and proceedings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) set up under
section 5 of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-21), see Fin. Crisis Inquiry
Comm'n, http://www.fcic.gov/ (last visited May 22, 2010) (hereinafter FCIC Proceedings]. On the Wall
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the Tripartite authorities (made up of the Bank of England, the Treasury, and the FSA) in
2007 and 2008.3s The Treasury issued a paper on international issues, 36 and the Bank of
England issued a separate paper on its money markets operations.37 A series of reports
were produced by the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, under its ener-
getic Chairman John McFall, that included inter alia papers on financial stability, North-
ern Rock, transparency, bank supervisory reform, failing banks, Icelandic banks, bank
remuneration, international issues, and "too big to fail." 38 Two reports were produced by
House of Lords committees on regulatory reform and the European regulatory architec-
ture.39 The FSA had issued its own internal review on the supervision of Northern Rock
on March 26, 2008, which led, in particular, to the establishment of a "Supervisory En-
hancement Programme" (SEP).40 Further papers were issued on the creation of a paral-
lel-enhanced liquidity regime with a model code on remuneration practices.41 The
Street Reform Bill and U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, see U.S. Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, http://banking.senate.gov/ (last visited May 22, 2010); and
House Comm. on Fin. Sers., http://financialservices.house.gov/ (last visited May 22, 2010). On negotiation
progress, see Congress Divided Over Financial Refsrm Bill, CNN WIRE STAFF, Apr. 18, 2010, http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/04/18/congress.wall.street/. On the Lehman failure, see Lehman Bros.
Holdings Inc. Chapter 11 Proceedings Exam'r's Report, available at http://lehmanreport.jenner.com/; and
FCIC Proceedings. On the subsequent SEC charges against Goldman Sachs in April in connection with
fraud in the structuring and marketing of CDOs tied to subprime mortgages, see SEC Charges Goldman Sachs
Wirh Fraud in Structuring and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages, U.S. SEC. & ExcH. Comm'N,
Apr. 16, 2010, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm; Litigation Release No. 21489, U.S. SEC.
& ExcfI. COMn'N, Apr. 16, 2010, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm; and Com-
plaint, SEC v. Goldman Sachs, No. 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010).
35. HM TREASURY, BANK OF ENGLAND & FIN. SERVICES AUTH., BANKING REFORM-PROTECTING DE-
POSITORS: A DISCUSSION PAPER (2007); HM TREASURY, BANK OF ENGLAND & FIN. SERVICES AUTH.,
FINANCIAL STABILITY AND DEPOSITOR PROTECTION: STRENGTHENING THE FRAMEWORK, Cm 7308
(2008); TRIPARTITE AUTH., FINANCIAL STABILITY AND DEPOSITOR PROTECTION, (2008) Cm 7436; TRI-
PARTITE AUTH., FINANCIAL STABILITY AND DEPOSITOR PROTECTION: SPECIAL RESOLUTION REGIME, Cm
7459 (2008).
36. BANK OF ENGLAND, THE FRAMEWORK FOR BANK OF ENGLAND'S OPERATIONS IN THE STERLING
MONEY MARKETs (2008) (referred to as the Bank's "Red Book").
37. HM TREASURY, FINANCIAL STABILITY AND DEPOSITOR PROTECTION: CROss-BORDER CHAL-
LENGES AND RESPONSES (2008), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.U.K./d/consult-depositor
protectionOl0708.pdf.
38. Treasury Comm., Oral Evidence: Financial Stability, HOUSE OF COMMONS, 2007, HC 292-I http://
www.publications.parliament.U.K/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmtreasy/292/7020101.htm; Treasury Comm.,
The Run on the Rock, HOUSE OF COMMONS, 2008, HC 56-I; Treasury Comm., Financial Stability and Trans-
parenty, HOUSE OF COMMONS, 2008, HC 371; Treasury Comm., Banking Reform, HOUSE OF COMMONS,
2008, HC 1008; Treasury Comm., Banking Crisis: Dealing with the Failure ofthe U.K Banks, HOUSE OF COM-
MONS, 2009, HC 416; Treasury Comm., The Impact ofthe Failure ofthe Icelandic Banks, HOUSE OF COMMONS,
2009, HC 402; Treasury Comm., Banking Crisis: Reforming Corporate Governance and Pay in the City, HOUSE
OF COMMONS, 2009, HC 519; Treasury Comm., Too Important to Fail-Too Important to Ignore, HOUSE OF
COMMONS, 2010, HC 261.
39. Econ. Affairs Comm., Banking Supervision and Regulation, HOUSE OF LORDS, 2009, HL 101; European
Union Comm., The Future ofEU Financial Regulation and Supervision, HOUSE OF LORDS, 2009, HL 106; see
also Treasury Comm., Proposals for European Financial Supervision: Further Report, HOUSE OF COMMONS 2009,
HC 37.
40. Fin. Servs. Auth., Erecutive Summary, available at http://www.fsa.gov.UK/pubs/other/execsummary.
pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
41. Fin. Servs. Auth., Strengthening Liquidity Standards 2: Liquidity Reporting, CP09/13 (2009); see also Fin.
Servs. Auth., Review of the Liquidity Requirements for Banks and Building Societies, 07/7 (2007); Fin. Sers. Auth.,
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National Audit Office (NAO) published its report on HM Treasury: the Nationalisation of
Northern Rock on March 20, 2009.42 Other more specific or technical regulatory papers
have also been issued by the U.K. authorities over the last two years.43
II. Turner Review-March 2009
One of the most important documents published in the United Kingdom was the re-
view on the Global Banking Crisis conducted by Lord Adair Turner, the incoming Chair-
man of the FSA, which was published on March 18, 2009.44 Lord Turner had been asked
by the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, to provide a report following his appointment in
September 2008, on the origins of the financial crisis with an assessment of the regulatory
deficiencies that arose, and to make recommendations for reform. Turner had outlined a
number of the key ideas contained in the review in an earlier speech on the financial crisis
in January 2009.4s This review followed other speeches by key FSA personnel on various
aspects of the crisis including structured finance, investors, and deterrence.
The Turner Review considers the background to the crisis (Chapter 1 "What Went
Wrong") and the key regulatory lessons to be drawn (Chapter 2, "What to Do").46 Other
wider issues are referred to with regard to product regulation, counter-cyclical tools, and
balancing liquidity and stability (Chapter 3), with additional comments on implementa-
tion and transition (Chapter 4).47 The FSA issued a further discussion paper in support of
the Turner Review48 that expands on the issues set out in Chapter 2 with more specific
discussion, background material, and questions for consideration. The main recommen-
dations are restated with a note of the other regulatory agencies involved and proposed
delivery dates (referred to as "implementation dependencies"). 49
The Turner Review generally rehearses and restates other regulatory initiatives already
identified or commenced within either the United Kingdom or elsewhere. It nevertheless
provides a substantive discussion of many of the key issues involved either in the report
directly or supporting discussion papers. This discussion then creates a new intellectual
basis for post-crisis regulatory reform and regulatory debate. It also announces several
important new initiatives.
Reforming Remuneration Practices in Financial Services, CP09/10 (2009) (issuance of the FSA draft Code on
remuneration).
42. Nat'I Audit Office, HM Treasury: Nationalisation ofNorthern Rock, HousE OF COMMONS, 2009, HC
298.
43. See generally Financial Services Authority, http://www.fsa.gov.UK/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
44. Turner Review, supra note 2.
45. Adair Turner, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Auth., Address at The Economist's Inaugural City Lecture: The
Financial Crisis and the Future of Financial Regulation Gan. 21, 2009), http://www.fsa.gov.UK/pages/Li-
brary/Communication/Speeches/2009/012 1-at.shtnl.
46. Turner Review, supra note 2.
47. Id.
48. Fin. Servs. Auth., Discussion Paper: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (2009) [hereinafter
Discussion Paper].
49. Id. at 118-122.
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A. FIANcIAL CRIsis
The Turner Review considers the background to the crisis in terms of global conditions,
U.K. developments, international regulation, and a series of further more specific theo-
retical issues. In terms of global conditions, the Turner Review focuses on the financial
sector growth, increased leverage, changing forms of maturity transformation (and expan-
sion of the "shadow banking" system), a misplaced reliance on modern risk management
theory (referred to as maths), and "hard-wired procyclicality" created through ratings,
triggers, margins, and haircuts.50
The examination focuses on the securitized credit market, which was intended to diver-
sify and reduce risk rather than aggravate it. This market had been stimulated by substan-
tial global macro-imbalances with low real interest rates and a search for yield uplift with
the perception that the global economy had become less risky as part of a "Great Modera-
tion" or "Great Stability" of risk management.5 Seven features are identified as charac-
terizing the new financial marketplace with the massive growth in the scale and
complexity of securitized credit intermediation, extensive commercial bank involvement in
trading activities, increased leverage, new forms of maturity transformation, misplaced
reliance on finance theory, and excessive reliance on ratings with inadequate bank capital
buffers.5 2
The discussion of the crisis is possibly overcomplicated, which also confuses consequent
factors (which follow from other conditions) rather than original causal factors behind the
specific crisis that arose. A number of the factors identified relate to the conditions that
aggravated the crisis or became more relevant after it had occurred. These conditions
were not necessarily causal in themselves. The causes of the crisis were separately summa-
rized by Verena Ross, Director of Strategy and Risk at the FSA, in terms of significant
global macroeconomic imbalances over the last decade, the increased complexity in the
securitized credit model, rapid extension of credit in the United States and United King-
dom, increased leverage, and an underestimation of bank and market liquidity risk, which
corresponds with other writers' formulations.s3
B. REGULATORY RESPONSE
The Turner Review considers regulatory reform in terms of ten possible action areas
including systemic control, accounting and liquidity, deposit protection and bank resolu-
tion, credit ratings, remuneration, derivatives clearing, systemic oversight, supervisory ap-
proach, prudential and conduct of business control, risk management and governance,
commercial banking, and securities trading and cross-border banks within the E.U.54
This examination is based on its assessment of the crisis and theoretical issues identified.
It is nevertheless accepted that many of the reforms will be dependent on European and
international consensus.
50. Turner Review, supra note 2, at 21-22.
51. Id. at 11-25.
52. Id. at 28.
53. Walker, Financial Crisis Cause and Correction, supra note 1, at n.1 (summarizing the crisis in terms of
massive accumulation of credit and debt, product innovation and disclosure, mispricing of credit risk and asset
valuation, the co-mingling of risk, and lack of effect liquidity and market support).
54. Turner Review, supra note 2, at 51.
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1. Systemic Regulation
The Turner Review recommends that a systemic approach be adopted for financial reg-
ulation.5 This policy is justified based on the maturity transformation of banks, the po-
tentially systemic nature of banking liquidity risks, and the damage and consequences of
bank system failure for the real economy. The paper identifies an inadequate focus on
systemic risk and the sustainability of whole business models and failure to design regula-
tory tools to deal with systemic issues as being a major deficiency. 5 6 While the review
does provide an instructive clarification of regulatory policy, it is arguable that these defi-
ciencies should have been the core objective of financial regulation historically. Con-
sumer (depositor) protection and financial stability are traditionally identified as the
principal justifications for financial regulation. While specific national authorities such as
the FSA may have over-focused on individual bank (idiosyncratic) rather than market (sys-
temic) effects, this justification can be criticized as being a misunderstanding of the core
function of financial control on the part of the regulators.57 Specific markets should have
been examined as a whole (and not just individual institutions in isolation) with the rela-
tionship between separate sectors also being taken into account especially as the U.K.
FSA is a single regulator operating under an integrated regulatory regime set up under the
FSMA 2000.58
C. CAPITAL AND ACCOUNTING
The Turner Review considers that capital, accounting, and liquidity factors contributed
to the origins of the crisis. Inadequate capital against trading book positions had allowed
excessive leverage and maturity transformation changes increased system-wide liquidity
risk with market-to-market accounting supporting a "self-reinforcing irrational exuber-
ance,"
5 9 
with banks then having insufficient capital reserves to "absorb losses." 60 Leverage
is, nevertheless, a factor of liquidity as well as capital, while the growth of securitized
product markets necessarily increases trading or position risk. Stock market growth and
market confidence arose from more general economic conditions rather than simple ac-
counting measures.
The Turner Review draws seven specific conclusions in connection with the need to
increase the quantity and quality of overall capital, raise trading book capital (by a further
factor of three), avoid pro-cyclicality in Basel II implementation, create counter-cyclical
capital buffers, offset pro-cyclicality in published accounts (with the inclusion of a new
"Economic Cycle Reserve"), impose a gross leverage "backstop" ratio (of assets to capital),
and strengthen liquidity supervision, and regulation (with a possible minimum "funding
ratio rule"). 61
55. Id. at 52.
56. Id. at 53.
57. Id. at 84.
58. M. BLAIR, ET AL., FiNANcAL SERVICES LAW 14 (2d ed. 2009).
59. Turner Review, supra note 2, at 25.
60. Id. at 53.
61. Id.
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D. LIQUIDITY
It is generally accepted that liquidity risk management must be enhanced in the Turner
Review. The FSA had issued a discussion paper on liquidity in December 2007, with a full
consultation paper in December 2008, after the crisis, and separate papers on reporting
and interim arrangements in April and June 2009.62 The later paper includes a require-
ment for the imposition of a detailed Individual Liquidity Adequacy Assessment (ILAA)
and Individual Liquidity Guidance (ILG) with strengthened liquidity reserves and height-
ened stress testing.63 A further follow-up paper was then issued in October 2009.64
The FSA has also been considering whether a core-funding ratio should be imposed in
addition to individual tailored liquidity measures. 65 This ratio could use either simple
loan-to-deposit ratios or more sophisticated core-funding calculations based on retail de-
posits and long-term wholesale funding as against total liabilities.66 A core-funding ratio
may be used either as an absolute ceiling (backstop rule) or as an indicator to assess sys-
tems-wide risks and matters to be dealt with in Individual Liquidity Guidance (ILG).67
E. PRO-CYCLIcALITY
The Basel H Capital Accord is specifically criticized in the Turner Review for its essen-
tially pro-cyclical effects.68 One result is that banks are required to hold more capital
where the creditworthiness of borrowers falls during a downturn, although it is arguable
that this situation is precisely what should happen in light of the increased credit risk
involved. The FSA has already introduced measures to require banks to use "through-
the-cycle" estimates of possible loan losses (with "variable scalars"), rather than "point in
time" measures, to limit the pro-cyclical effects of Basel II implementation in the United
Kingdom.69 All of these reforms are certainly welcome.
More difficult issues arise with regard to the creation of counter-cyclical capital buffers.
Separate discretionary and formula driven systems are available using different metrics.
These can either work through increasing minimum ratios, such as on core tier one from
four percent to seven percent or as a deduction from capital. 70 The Turner Review argues
that increasing capital in economic upturns (which would subsequently be available during
a downturn) would decrease the probability of bank default, reduce system-wide bank
failure, and avoid any amplification of the economic cycle.71 A figure of two to three
62. Fin. Servs. Auth., Review of the Liquidity Requirements for Banks and Building Societies, supra note 41; Fin.
Servs. Auth., Strengthening Liquidity Standards, CP08/22 (2008); Fin. Servs. Auth., Strengthening Liquidity
Standards 2: Liquidity Reporting, supra note 41; Fin. Servs. Auth., Strengthening Liquidity Standards 3: Liquidity
Transitional Measures, CP09/14 (2009).
63. George A. Walker, Liquidity Risk Management-Polity Conflict and Correction, 4(4) CAPITAL MARKETS L.
J. 451-61 (2009).
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69. Id.
70. Id. at 62.
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percent of weighted risk assets is suggested in the Discussion Paper as a possible benefit
figure.72
The same effects may nevertheless be achieved considerably more simply by increasing
core tier one capital with banks already adopting a "through-the-cycle" approach to loss
provision. Supervisory authorities already have considerable discretion in negotiating ad-
equate reserve levels, both in terms of capital and liquidity with financial institutions,
which could be adjusted across the cycle without any formal rule amendment or specific
mechanical measures. In the event of any doubt or residual uncertainty, the market dis-
tortional effects of this new charge should mitigate against, rather than in favor of, its
adoption. Existing national systems, such as that adopted in Spain are also more specific
and particular than suggested in the Turner Review. Any revision in this area should be
postponed until clear, commonly agreed, and tested measures have been produced that
also satisfy any final cost benefit analysis.
F. GROSS LEVERAGE RATIO
The Turner Review supports the adoption of a maximum gross leverage ratio such as an
asset-to-capital multiple (ACM) of 20:1, as used in Canada.73 A 12.5% leverage limit is
also effectively imposed under the Basel banking book rules that approximately equates
with a total non-adjusted figure of twenty percent.74 A simple ratio will further not take
into the account the specificities of individual types of banking and securities business,
with the main abuses being in the securities and not commercial bank areas. A relatively
low ratio may then interfere with specific institutions, while an unnecessary high ratio
would have no effect in practice. The imposition of a specific ratio is arguably then un-
necessary and inappropriate. The issue could be more simply dealt with through recom-
mended guidelines that take into account the full range of different activities that may be
involved in different institutions and more complex groups. The most appropriate figures
in any particular case can then be discussed with supervisors and set on an individual
institutional basis.
G. WIDER ISSUES
The Turner Review raises three additional wider "open questions" in connection with
product regulation, counter-cyclical economic management, and irrational momentum ef-
fects. 75 The objective is to raise "debate on principles."76 This task is considered to be
particularly necessary in light of the limits of market efficiency and market rationality
discussed elsewhere within the paper and the extent to which markets can be made more
efficient, rational, and self-correcting through transparency, liquidity, and technical effi-
ciency corrections alone. The discussion in this part of the paper is, nevertheless, less
substantial and more confused, with no firm conclusions being drawn.
72. Discusion Paper, supra note 48.
73. Turner Review, supra note 2, at 67-68.
74. Id.
75. Id. at ch. 3.
76. Id.
SUMMER 2010
762 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
IU. Treasury White Paper on Reforming Fianancial Markets-July 2009
The Treasury released its response White Paper on Reforming Financial Markets on July
9, 2009.77 This was an important policy document in setting out the government's think-
ing on regulatory reform following the crisis and subsequent discussions including specifi-
cally under the Turner Review. While the Bank of England had not been consulted
separately, and the governor only being provided with a copy just before release, many of
the key reform ideas previously highlighted by the Bank have been taken forward in the
White Paper. The White Paper is generally based on strengthened regulation and bank
resolution with enhanced systemic risk oversight to be carried out principally under a new
Counsel for Financial Stability (CFS).78 The Paper also includes important sections on
consumer protection, competition, and, predictably, E.U. and international cooperation.79
As with the Turner Review, large parts of the report simply restate initiatives being taken
forward by other bodies with much, if not most, of the detailed content of the reform
package being postponed for subsequent agreement or distillation.80 The document is
nevertheless of importance in clarifying in a considerably more moderate and balanced
manner the U.K. government's opinion (rather than the regulator's opinion) of the
changes required in the new post-crisis environment.
A. STRUCTURE
As with many other official documents, the July White Paper provides its formulation
of the causes of the crisis (Chapter 3) with a discussion of regulatory reforms being post-
poned until the beginning Chapter 4 (beginning on p. 47).81 This discussion follows the
Treasury's summary of the importance of financial markets to the U.K. economy (under
the title 'Global Financial Markets' in Chapter 1) and a summary of the action already
taken by the government in response to the crisis (Chapter 2).82 While the core reforms
are summarized in terms of more effective regulation and supervision, systemic oversight,
resolution (and confidence), and taxpayer interest, the chapter headings focus on regula-
tion (Chapter 4), defining systemically systemic firms and managing systemic risk (Chap-
ters 5 and 6), international and European co-operation (Chapter 7), consumer protection
(Chapter 8), and competition (Chapter 9).83 It is interesting that this paper is entitled
Reforming Financial Markets, rather than Reforming Banking Regulation or Reforming Bank-
ing Markets, which reflects the wider policy approach adopted by the Treasury and espe-
cially with the inclusion of consumer protection and market competition issues. The
earlier Turner Review only referred to reforming the Global Banking System more
specifically.
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B. MARKETS AND CmIsis
The functions of markets are outlined, although this summary is somewhat unstruc-
tured and disjointed. This review is essentially based on the efficient allocation of funds,
risk management, innovation support, wealth accumulation, transaction completion, as
well as monetary and fiscal policy management effectiveness. 8 U.K. financial services
employs over one million people, provides eight percent of G.D.P., and generates £38bn
in trade surplus, with over £250bn having been provided in terms of corporation tax,
income tax, and national insurance contributions over the last nine years.85 While the
City of London is the major financial center in Europe, other U.K. cities also have signifi-
cant international reputations, including Edinburgh. The separate report by Sir Win
Bischoff on UK International Financial Services-The Future in May 2009, noted that the
eight percent output figure is comparable to the United States and Europe, although sig-
nificantly less than other service-based economies such as Singapore and Hong Kong, and
substantially less than U.K. manufacturing output at fourteen percent. 86 The U.K. gov-
ernment's regulatory policy has been designed to support economic growth and prosper-
ity, including the creation of the single integrated regulatory system under the Financial
Services Authority (FSA), Financial Services, and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), and Single
Market within the E.U.87
The causes of the crisis are summarized in terms of failures in market discipline, sys-
temic oversight, as well as what may be referred to as "regulatory delay." The origins of
the crisis are separately summarized in terms of innovation and search for yield, product
complexity and non-transparency, poor risk management (in failing to understand the ex-
posures assumed), and distortive remuneration packages. All of these failures undermined
market discipline and were aggravated by poor governance while regulators failed to ap-
preciate the systemic threats created. The main causal factors behind the U.K. crisis were
principally summarized in terms of leverage, wholesale funding, high-risk product
streams, and poor acquisition decisions.
C. INsTrrTirONAL REVISION
The government considered that the integrated regulatory model set up in the United
Kingdom under the FSMA remained the most appropriate although it would formalize
arrangements for institutional cooperation on financial stability and strengthen the gov-
ernance arrangements, objectives, and powers of the FSA rather than include the FSA and
Treasury within the new subcommittee on Financial Stability to be set up at the Bank of
England under the Banking Act 2009.88 The government had decided to establish a new
Council for Financial Stability (CFS) under a statute that would replace the earlier Tripar-
tite Standing Committee, but again consists of the Bank of England, the FSA, and the
Treasury, with meetings chaired by the Chancellor of the Exchequer89 The objectives of
the CFS would be to analyze and examine emerging risk to the financial stability of the
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. HM TREASURY, U.K IN'L FRNANcIAL SERVICES-THE FUTURE (2009).
87. Id.
88. Banking Act 2009, §§ 238-40.
89. Id. § VI.
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U.K. economy and coordinate the most appropriate response.90 The earlier informal
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Financial Stability entered into between the
tripartite authorities in 1998, and then replaced in March 2006, was to be replaced by new
Terms of Reference for the CFS.91
The government had already extended the governance arrangements within the Bank of
England under the Banking Act 2009.92 The government would confer on the FSA a
parallel statutory financial stability objective, in addition to its core objectives of maintain-
ing confidence, promoting understanding, consumer protection, and financial crime.93
Failing to impose a specific statutory objective concerning financial stability on the FSA
always appeared to be a significant omission. This gap could only be explained in terms of
the combined or collective nature of the role with the FSA having to work with the Bank
of England and Treasury. The FSA had nevertheless interpreted its other four statutory
objectives to include financial stability from an early stage. Any argument or claim that it
failed to realize that it was required or expected to assume a more general systemic (full
sector or macro-prudential), rather than solely individual firm (micro-prudential), role or
function may be considered to be disingenuous.
The statutory objectives of the FSA were, in particular, to be extended following the
White Paper to include an express duty to have regard to international and European
developments and to consider wider economic and fiscal costs of failure in determining
the most appropriate regulatory action to take.94 Further governance amendments would
be considered following the FSA's own review of its board effectiveness. 95 The FSA's
rule-making powers under Section 138 FSMA would be extended to cover all of its revised
statutory objectives, in addition to consumer protection.96 This authority would then in-
clude larger economic justifications and taxpayer interest, as well as financial stability,
which is implied in consumer protection.
The Treasury White Paper contains further discussion on such matters as enhanced
regulation and resolution, significantly systemic firms and systemic oversight, European
and international co-operation, consumer protection, and competition, although much of
these matters simply follow other regulatory initiatives that have been taken forward at the
European or other international levels.97
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Banking Act 2009, §§ 238-40 (This included: (a) providing the Bank with a formal statutory financial
stability objective; (b) setting up the Financial Stability Committee (FSC) within its Court including external
membership; (c) replacing its earlier governance arrangements with a smaller more strategically focused
Court of Directors; and (d) conferring new power and authority in connection with the administration of the
Special Resolution Regime (SRR) set up for banks and building societies under the Banking Act 2009).
93. HM TREASURY, FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKErs Acr 2000, 2009, c. 8, § 2(2) (U.K), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/pdf/U.K.pga_20000008_en.pdf; see also BLAIR, ET AL., supra note 58;
see also W. BLAIR Er AL., BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION (3d. ed. 2002).
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IV. Walker Review of Corporate Governance-July 2009
The former Executive Director of the Bank of England, Sir David Walker, had been
asked by the U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown in February 2009, to examine corporate
governance in the U.K. banking industry and make recommendations for its reform.98
The Review was issued on July 16, 200999 and followed separate reports by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision and by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) on governance matters. 00 The Walker Review does not at-
tempt to explain the crisis, although it notes that the fact that a number of institutions in
almost identical circumstances performed with widely varying results must have meant an
important factor was the manner in which they were managed.
Despite the massive dislocation and costs suffered, a correct balance had to be achieved
in terms of innovation and regulation and between the interests of shareholders and soci-
ety. An appropriate balance had also to be achieved between the roles of executive and
non-executive board members and short and long-term company objectives. Sir David
attributed good corporate governance to the ability and experience of the individuals con-
cerned and the effectiveness of their collaboration with the principal recommendations
attempting to reconcile the need for prescription, judgment, and flexibility.oi Sir David
had worked closely with Sir Christopher Hogg, Chairman of the Financial Reporting
Council (FRC), which was undertaking a parallel review of the U.K. Combined Code on
Corporate Governance for all listed companies in the United Kingdom.
The Walker Review identifies five key themes.102 The FRC Combined Code was con-
sidered fit for purpose with Sir David specifically approving of its "comply or explain"
approach to guidance and provisions applicable to banks and other financial institutions
(referred to as BOFIs).i03 The principal deficiencies in board conduct identified related
more to patterns of behavior and operation rather than organization, with many boards
failing to carry out the core "challenge step" within the decision-taking procedure (or
sequence). 04 There had to be higher degrees of board level engagement in the monitor-
ing of risk and the risk process, including the institution's risk appetite and tolerance. 05
Fund managers and major shareholders had to engage more directly with firms to support
long-term performance improvements with boards being receptive to this intervention.'06
98. WALKER REVIEW, fipra note 4, at 5.
99. Id. at 1.
100. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCING CoRPoRA-TE GOVERNANCE FOR BANKING
ORGANISATIONs (2006) (the Basel Committee issued a revised set of guidance on the adoption of effective
corporate governance practices within banks and banking groups. The purpose was to attempt to ensure the
adoption and implementation of sound corporate governance practices within banks and banking groups
across the world although this would not replace but support existing regulatory laws, rules, and codes. This
revises the earlier guidance issued by the Committee in 1999. The paper also attempts to incorporate the
principles for corporate governance issued by the OECD in 2004).
101. WALKER REVIEW, supra note 4.
102. Id. at 11.
103. Id.
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There had to be substantial enhancement of board level oversight of remuneration poli-
cies, especially with regard to variable pay and associated disclosures. 07
The Review contains thirty-nine recommendations to be given effect through incorpo-
ration as guidance into the Combined Code provisions.'08 The FRC would determine
how these recommendations would apply with regard to non-financial entities also subject
to the terms of the Combined Code, which applied to all listed companies. 0 9 The recom-
mendations were structured in terms of board size, composition and qualification, board
function and evaluation of performance, institutional shareholder role, communication
and engagement, risk governance, and remuneration."l 0
The Walker Review was important in confirming the need for strong and effective cor-
porate governance within banks and other financial institutions. This clearly goes beyond
remuneration and concerns the key role and function of boards on financial institutions
including their size, composition, qualification, function, and performance. Many of the
more specific recommendations made may be considered to be predictable and more
clarificatory in nature. Important confirmations are nevertheless made, for example, with
regard to training, support, commitment, risk focus, communication, and evaluation. The
governance of risk is also to be strengthened, especially with the establishment of a sepa-
rate board risk committee and the appointment of a dedicated chief risk officer (CRO)
with sufficient power and authority to act.III The remuneration recommendations largely
follow the new culture set out in the FSA Remuneration Code requirements and princi-
ples, although some important extensions are made in terms of "high end" package ap-
proval and disclosure, payment deferrals (of up to five years), conditions, "clawback," as
well as remuneration committee procedures and consultancy.11 2 To what extent major
financial institutions would implement all of these proposals and the effect of the deferral,
conditions, and performance obligations remains to be seen.
The more difficult and sensitive recommendations relate to attempting to reinforce the
role of fund managers and other institutional shareholder groups. Professional managers
and owners may resent the interference and question the need for this direct involvement.
Many may argue that they are entitled to rely on the paid executive and non-executive
management and various committees and sub-committees appointed to carry out effective
governance within a company. Many are more concerned with managing total portfolio
performance and acting in the interests of their specific clients rather than protecting the
interests of the investee entity on a longer-term basis. This fundamental difference in
approach and responsibility remains a difficult issue going forward.
107. WAUER REVIEW, supra note 4, at 12. Board remuneration committee functions had to be extended
beyond board members to include remuneration throughout the firm with committees able to withstand
pressure from shareholders or the executive where appropriate. Performance conditions and deferment of
variable pay for executive board members and other senior executives had to be strengthened with deferrals
being up to five years.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 14-21.
Ill. Id. at 13.
112. Id. at 115.
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V. Bank Resolution and the Banking Act 2009
Further major reforms in connection with bank reconstruction and reconciliation were
taken forward under the Banking Act 2009, which came into effect in February.'IS The
government had introduced to the House of Commons the Banking Bill 2008, on October
6, 2008 (Bill 147) following the consultation papers issued by the Treasury with the Bank
of England and Financial Services Authority (FSA) on banking reform in October 2007,
and January and July 2008.114 These reports were produced in response to the apparent
weaknesses revealed in U.K banking law concerning the management and resolution of
banks facing financial. difficulties. This review was considered necessary after the
problems at Northern Rock, which was forced to seek emergency assistance from the
Bank of England in September 2007, and was subsequently nationalized in February 2008,
after private sector bids for the bank had been rejected by the Treasury.'" 5 The Banking
Act 2009 does not alter the structure of the system of integrated financial regulation set up
under the FSMA, although it supplements it with the establishment of a new resolution
regime for banks and other consequential amendments to the structure and operation of
the Bank of England and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) which was
set up under Part 15 FSMA.
The principal purpose of the Banking Act was to establish a new Special Resolution
Regime (SRR) for failing banks.' 6 Transitional provisions had been introduced under the
Banking (Special Provisions) Act in February 2008, to allow the Treasury to transfer the
assets and liabilities of a bank to another institution where such action was considered
necessary to maintain financial stability or protect the public interest.' 7 These provisions
were nevertheless incomplete by themselves and were intended to lapse after one year. A
more complete and coherent permanent SRR regime was then created under the Banking
Act."t 8 The Treasury may extend the application of the SRR to building societies by order
(under Section 130) as well as to credit unions with appropriate amendment (Section
131).119 The Treasury has consulted separately on the establishment of a parallel regime
for investment banks (under Section 233).120
The Banking Act contains three general procedures for dealing with failing banks.
These consist of the new permanent Special Resolution Regime (SRR under Part 1), a
dedicated Bank Insolvency Procedure (BIP under Part 2), and a revised Special Adminis-
tration Regime (SAR or Bank Administration Procedure (BAP) under Part 3).121 The
113. Banking Act 2009.
114. Walker, Credit Markets, Bretton Woods II and Global Response, supra note 1, at 79.
115. Id.
116. Walker, Credit Contraction, Financial Collapse and Global Recession, supra note 1.
117. Banking (Special Provisions) Act, 2008, c.2 (Eng.).
118. Id.
119. Banking Act §§ 130-31.
120. HM TREASURY, DEVELOPING EFFEcTIvE RESOLUTION ARRANGEMENTS FOR INVESThE&NT BANKS
(2009), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/consultinvestment-banks.htm. A new definition of in-
vestment bank is created under Section 232 of the Banking Act 2009. An"investment bank" means an institu-
tion which satisfies the following three conditions: (a) holds permission under the FSMA to carry on the
regulated activity of safeguarding and administering investments, dealing in investments as principal, or deal-
ing in investments as agent; (b) the institution holds client assets; and (c) is incorporated in, or formed under
the law of any part of, the United Kingdom.
121. Banking Act 2009 § 1(i-v).
SUMMER 2010
768 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Banking Act amends the operation of the FSCS (Part 4), formalizes the role of the Bank of
England in its oversight of U.K. payment systems (including payment systems embedded
within securities transfer systems) (Part 5), and strengthens the nature of the system of
note issuance by Scottish and Northern Irish banks in the event that an issuing bank may
face financial difficulty (Part 6).122
A. SPECIAL RESOLUTION REGIME (SRR)
The SRR is established under Part I of the Banking Act. The purpose of the SRR is to
deal with situations where all or part of the business of a bank has encountered, or is likely
to encounter, financial difficulties.123 The SRR provides for three specific "stabilization
options" with either a of transfer to a private sector purchaser (Section 1), transfer to a
"bridge" bank following the U.S. model (Section 12), or transfer to temporary public
ownership (Section 13).124 The three stabilization options may be achieved through the
exercise of one or more of the "stabilization powers" which consist of "share transfer
powers" and "property transfer powers" (Section 1(4)).125 The SRR is to be implemented
by the Bank of England with the Treasury and FSA.126
B. SPECIAL RESOLUTION OBJECTIVES
The Banking Act sets out five "special resolution objectives" (Section 4).127 These
objectives consist of protecting and enhancing the stability of the "U.K. financial sys-
tems," protecting and enhancing public confidence in the stability of the U.K. banking
systems, protecting depositors, protecting public funds, and avoiding interfering with
property rights in contravention of a Convention right under the Human Rights Act
1998.128
C. CODE OF PRACTICE
The Treasury has issued a Code of Practice concerning the use of the stabilization pow-
ers and the bank insolvency and bank administration procedures.129 The code includes
specific guidance on the achievement of the special resolution objectives, consultation in-
formation, provision of advice by one relevant authority to another, exercise conditions,
reports, and notices. 30
122. Id. § I (vi-vii).
123. Id. § 1(1).
124. Id. § 1(2).
125. Id. § 1(4).
126. Banking Act 2009 § 4(3).
127. Id. § 4.
128. Id.
129. H1M TREASURY, BANKiNG Acr 2009-SPEcIAL REsOLUTION REGIME: CODE OF PRACICE (2009),
available at http//www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/bankingact2009_codeofpractice.pdf
130. Id.
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D. EXERCISE OF POWERS
The FSA is to determine whether the general conditions for the exercise of a stabiliza-
tion power have been complied with (Section 7(l)).131 The relevant bank must be failing
or likely to fail in order to satisfy the threshold conditions imposed under FSMA Section
41(2) FSMA (Condition I under Section 7(2)),132 or it is not reasonably likely that action
will be taken to allow the bank to satisfy the threshold conditions apart from any stabiliza-
tion powers (Condition 2 under Section 7(3)).133
The Bank of England may then trigger a private sector purchase or bridge bank transfer
where one of two further conditions has been satisfied. The power must be necessary in
the public interest with regard to the stability of the U.K. financial systems, maintaining
confidence in the stability of the U.K. banking systems or the protection of depositors
(Condition A under Section 8(2)(a), (b) and (c)),134 or the Treasury has provided financial
assistance to a bank, has recommended the exercise of the stabilization power to protect
the public interest, and the exercise of the power is considered appropriate by the Bank of
England (Condition B under Section 8(5)(a) and (b)).35
The Treasury may only take a bank into temporary public ownership (under Sections
9(1) and 13(2))136 where the exercise is necessary to resolve or reduce a serious threat to
the stability of the U.K. financial systems (Condition A under Section 9(2))137 or to pro-
tect the public interest after the Treasury has provided financial assistance to the bank
(Condition B under Section 9(3)).138
E. PARTIAL TRANSFERS
Restrictions may be placed on the making of partial transfers of some, but not all, of the
property, rights, and liabilities of a bank under the property transfer powers. By order,
the Treasury may impose restrictions by reference to the nature of the property, rights,
and liabilities forming part of the transfer (Section 47).139 Private law rights are to be
protected under Section 48.14 This restriction will apply to any interests that may be
specified including security interests, title transfer collateral arrangements, set-off, netting
arrangements, and other protective arrangements.141 Authorities may require "residual
banks" and "other group companies" to provide services and facilities (continuity obliga-
tions) following a partial transfer of business.142 The powers are again exercisable by the
Treasury by order. Partial transfers may apply with regard to transfers of the deposit book
131. Banking Act 2009, § 7(1).
132. Id. § 7(2).
133. Id. § 7(3).
134. Id. § 8(2)(a-c).
135. Id. § 8(5)(a-b).
136. Banking Act 2009, §§ 9(1), 13(2).
137. Id. § 9(2).
138. Id. § 9(3).
139. Id. § 47.
140. Id. § 48.
141. Banking Act 2009: Restriction of Partial Property Transfers Order, 2009, SI 2009/332 (U.K.).
142. Banking Act 2009, § 63.
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only, facilitating pre-agreed private sector transfers, or cleaning up the bank's balance
sheet to remove distressed assets.143
The revised provisions prohibit the transfer of some, but not all netting contracts with
express carve outs for specific transactions, including non-transferrable foreign law con-
tracts and claims.144 Counterparty credit risk and bank regulatory capital compliance are
principally secured through netting arrangements. It is essential that full legal certainty be
secured in this regard. Liabilities should be transferred with associated collateral to en-
sure effective enforcement. The integrity of structured finance transactions is also to be
protected subject to final arrangements.
F. INCIDENTAL AND AMENDMENT POWERS
Incidental functions are specified in Sections 63-75.145 These include express provi-
sions concerning continuity, pensions, enforcement disputes, and tax.146 One of the most
controversial provisions in the original bill was the conferral of power on the Treasury to
amend the law by order "for the purpose of enabling the powers under this Part to be used
effectively, having regard to the special resolution objectives."14 7 This provision was re-
ferred to as the Henry VIII clause with its power of retroactive legal amendment. The
original Clause 65 was amended not to allow the Treasury to amend the Banking Act itself
or protections provided by the Banking Act, although the British Bankers' Association had
called for this restriction to be qualified further.148
The legal amendment power in Section 75 may be used for general or specific purposes
and be subject to either the draft affirmative procedure or the twenty-eight day affirmative
procedure within Parliament in urgent cases.149 This power was questioned by the House
of Lords'50 and examined by the Constitutional Committee of the House of Lords sepa-
rately.151 The Committee had accepted the general need for the provision although it was
not persuaded that the scope sought was justified and welcomed the government's indica-
tion that it would consider introducing a more limited and targeted retrospective power.
The Treasury may also issue regulations in connection with the tax consequences of im-
plementing the stabilization powers with a further retrospective effect (Henry VIII power)
being included in Section 74(5).152
143. Id. § 47.
144. Id. § 39.
145. Id. §§ 63-75.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 75.
148. Banking Act 2009, § 72.
149. Id. § 75.
150. HOUSE OF LORDS Comm., REPORT, 2008-9, H.L. 12, T 6; CONsrrurioN COmmrrEE, REPORT,
2008-9, H.L. 19, 1 7.
151. The Select Committee on the Constitution within the House of Lords considered the effect of clause
75 separately which allowed the Executive to unapply or modify existing laws with retrospective effect. The
Committee noted that there was not an absolute prohibition on Parliament giving the Executive power, by
order, to repeal, unapply or otherwise amend Acts of Parliament, delegated legislation or the common law
although constitutional principles required that (a) any such power should only be granted on compelling
justification, (b) the scope should be limited to the minimum necessary and (c) any order should generally be
subject to Parliamentary control (under negative or affirmative resolution).
152. Banking Act 2009, § 74(5).
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G. FINANCIL STABILRTY OBJECTIVE
The Banking Act also amended Section 2 of the Bank of England Act 1998 to include
an express financial stability objective for the Bank of England. 5 3 Section 2A of the Bank
of England Act 1998 is "to specify that an objective of the Bank shall be to contribute to
protecting and enhancing the stability of the financial systems" of the United Kingdom. 54
In so doing, the Bank is to work with other relevant bodies (including the Treasury and
FSA) with its Court of Directors determining and reviewing the Bank's strategy in rela-
tion to its financial stability objective in consultation with the Treasury.ss No further
guidance was provided in the Explanatory Notes on the Bank's objective of contributing
to the protection and enhancement of financial stability in the United Kingdom.
The court is required to create a separate Financial Stability Committee to make rec-
ommendations concerning the nature and implementation of the bank's strategy concern-
ing its financial stability objective, provide advice on the action to be taken in connection
with a specific institution or the exercise of the Bank's stabilization powers, exercise of the
Bank's functions in connection with inter-bank payment systems, and any other delegated
functions.156 The Financial Stability Committee is to consist of the Bank's Governor,
Deputy Governors of the Bank, and four other directors of the Bank appointed by the
Chair of the Court. 5 7 The number of members of the Court is also reduced from sixteen
to nine, but with meetings being reduced from monthly to seven times a year.158 The
Turner Review had argued that the FSA should be a member of the new committee, 159
although this occurred before it was announced that the government would set up the
separate Council for Financial Stability (CFS) with the FSA now sitting with the Bank and
Treasury on the new Counsel for Financial Stability (CFS).160
VI. Financial Services Act
The government brought forward a further Financial Services Bill on November 19,
2009.161 This was enacted on April 8, 2010, although a number of key provisions had to
be dropped by the government to allow passage before the general election in the United
Kingdom on May 6, 2010.162 The Act is generally designed to improve the oversight of
system-wide risks, deliver more effective regulation and supervision, ensure that remuner-
ation policies are transparent and appropriate, provide additional protection to consumers,
153. Id. § 238.
154. Id.
155. Id. § 238(2-3).
156. Id. § 238 (2B).
157. Id.
158. Id. §§ 239-40.
159. Turner Review, supra note 2.
160. Reforming Financial Markets, supra note 3.
161. Press Release, HM Treasury, Government Introduces Financial Services Bill 108/09 (Nov. 19, 2009),
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_108_09.htn.
162. Financial Services Act 2010 (c.28). The three key sets of provisions deleted related to the Council for
Financial Stability (clauses 1-4), the FSA's international function (clause 8) and collective court actions
(clauses 18-25). The government had to agree to their removal to allow the Bill to be passed before the
dissolution of Parliament and the general election. Ministers Abandon Council for Financial Stability Plan, BBC,
Apr. 7, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/houseofords/newsid_8606000/8606057.stm.
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and correct certain other perceived failures in the current regulatory system within the
United Kingdom. The Act supports the regulatory framework set up under the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), although it reforms and extends this in a number
of respects. The government had separately brought into effect the Banking Act 2009
referred to above to allow for the effective resolutions of banks in distress. A number of
the measures contained in the Act were provided for in the Treasury's paper on Reforming
Financial Markets in July 2009.163 As noted, the July 2009 paper was based on stronger
market discipline, better regulation, managing failure, and better market infrastructure.
The original Bill contained ten principal proposals for regulatory reform. A new Coun-
cil for Financial Stability (CFS) was to be established to replace the earlier Tripartite
Standing Committee made up of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Governor of the Bank
of England, and Chairman of the FSA.164 The FSA is given an express financial stability
statutory objective with its earlier objective of promoting public understanding of the fi-
nancial system being removed and responsibility for financial capability transferred to a
new consumer financial education body.165 The new agency will take over responsibility
of the FSA functions in connection with the National Strategy for Financial Capability.' 66
The FSA is to make general rules requiring firms to maintain remuneration policies
with the Treasury being able to issue regulations concerning the preparation, approval,
and disclosure of executives' remuneration reports.167 The FSA is to issue separate rules
concerning the preparation of recovery and resolution plans (RRPs).16 8 The FSA is given
new power to prohibit or require the disclosure of short selling practices.' 69 Greater en-
forcement powers are conferred on the FSA with explicit authority to suspend or limit
unauthorized person's permission or an approved person's approval.
A significant new power to bring forward collective proceedings was provided in respect
of financial services claims before these provisions were dropped from the final Act. Col-
lective proceedings were to be brought by a representative on behalf of a group with the
same or connected claims who would be entitled to proceed individually.o7 0 The repre-
sentative was not required to have a direct interest in the proceedings1 71 The FSA may
still issue rules requiring firms to establish consumer redress schemes where there has
been a widespread or regular failure by a firm to comply with its regulatory obligations.' 72
Credit card cheques may not be sent on an unsolicited basis.173
163. Reforming Financial Markets, supra note 3.
164. Press Release, HM Treasury, Government Introduces Financial Services Bill, supra note 161. The CFS
held its first informal meeting on Jan. 14, 2010. CFS Meeting Minutes, COUNCIL FIN. STABILITY, Jan. 14,
2010, httpi/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fincouncil financial_stability.htm. See also Financial Services Act
2010, rupra note 162, § 1.
165. Financial Services Act 2010 § 2.
166. Id.
167. Id. § 6.
168. Id. § 7.
169. Id. § 8.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. § 14.
173. Id. § 15.
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The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) is required to contribute to the
expenses incurred in the exercise of stabilization powers under the Banking Act 2009.174
This will take into the account the costs that the scheme would have incurred in funding
compensation payments if the stabilization power had not been exercised and payments
may be made on behalf of other compensation schemes. The FSA is to be given a new
power to obtain information relevant to financial stability with the Treasury being able to
require information or documents from participants in the Asset Protection Scheme (APS)
or similar schemes.s75 Additional provisions with regard to the new consumer financial
education body are set out in Schedule 1 with the Scottish Parliament to be consulted
where the new entity affects devolved powers under the Sewel Convention.176 Further
minor and technical amendments are made to the Banking Act 2009.
This is an important new legislative measure and much of the Act operates by way of
amendment to other existing statutes including, in particular, the FSMA 2000 and Bank-
ing Act 2009 although it does contain certain standalone provisions especially with regard
to the establishment of the Council for Financial Stability (CFS) and operation of the
consumer financial education body. The Act is generally concerned with financial stabil-
ity, financial capability, remuneration, recovery and resolution, collective action and re-
dress, and strengthening of other enforcement and recovery schemes.
A. FINANCIAL STABILITY
The November Bill provided for the establishment of the Council for Financial Stabil-
ity (CFS) consisting of the Chancellor, the Chair of the FSA, and Governor of the Bank of
England with the Chancellor as Chair.177 The CFS was anticipated in theJuly 2009 Trea-
sury paper on Reforming Financial Markets but had to be deleted from the final Act. 78
The Conservatives had objected to the new CFS with its future tide and role then being
dependent upon which party won the general election on May 6, 2010.
The duties and functions of the CFS were not specified in the Bill but referred to in the
White Paper. The CFS is to keep under review matters affecting the stability of the U.K.
financial system and to coordinate any action taken (or to be taken) by the relevant au-
thorities for the purpose of protecting or enhancing the stability of the system. 179 The
Treasury was given power to issue a statement on the exercise of the CFS's functions.
The Treasury had earlier issued draft Terms of Reference. 80 This restates the CFS's
functions and the Treasury's power to issue terms. The functions of the Bank, FSA, and
Treasury are confirmed following those set out in the revised Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) between the tripartite authorities issued in 2006.181 The CFS is respon-
sible for considering emerging risks to the financial stability of the U.K. and global
174. Id. § 16.
175. Id.
176. Legislative Consent Memorandum, Financial Services Bill (2009) (Scot.), available at http://
www.scotland.gov.uk/About/SeweVSessionThree/FinancialServicesBill.
177. Reforming Financial Markets, supra note 3.
178. Id. at ch. 4.
179. Id.
180. See HM TREASURY, COUNCIL FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY, DRAFr TERMS OF REFERENCE (2009),
available at http-J/www.hm-rreasury.gov.uk/d/fin-bill-tor.pdf.
181. Id. at 1 21.
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financial system and coordinating an appropriate response by the relevant U.K. authori-
ties. 182 It is only a monitoring and coordinating body. In pursuing its core objective of
monitoring stability, it will have regard to strategic medium to long-term developments
affecting financial stability and more immediate issues. 83 The CFS is to meet as neces-
sary to coordinate the authority's response in managing any financial or operational cri-
sis.18 4 The Financial Stability Sub-Committee (FSC) will draw on external expertise as
necessary through invited expert participation including members of the Court of the
Bank or FSA boards. 85 The Tripartite MOU is to be further revised to work with the
terms of reference for the FSC.18 6
The CFS is to meet at least four times a year or as otherwise necessary with other
timing, attendance, agenda, and minute matters being dealt with in the original Annex
A.187 Separate meetings of the CFS Deputies are to be held monthly under Annex B.188
This follows the earlier practice of the Tripartite and Tripartite Deputy meetings.
The statutory objectives of the FSA under the FSMA are amended under the final Act
by including a new financial stability objective (in Section 2(2) (ab) FSMA) and with its
existing public awareness objective in section 2(2)(b) FSMA being deleted.189 The finan-
cial stability objective is stated to be to contribute to the protection and enhancement of
the stability of the U.K. financial system.190 The FSA is to consult with the Treasury on
determining and reviewing its strategy in relation to the financial stability objective.19'
B. FENANcIL CAPABILYTY
With the repeal of the FSA's public awareness objective, responsibility for financial
stability is to be transferred to a new consumer financial education body (CFEB) to be set
up by the FSA under a new Section 6A FSMA.192 This parallels the Consumer Financial
Protection Agency (CFPA) to be set up in the United States.193 The function of the
agency is to enhance understanding and knowledge of members of the public on financial
matters and the public's ability to manage its own affairs.194 The types of money gui-
dance, service, and programs to be provided by the CFEB are set out in Section 6A(2).195
182. Id. at 17.
183. Id. at 1 16.
184. Id. at T 19.
185. Id. at 1 20.
186. COUNCIL FOR FIN. STABILITY, DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE, supra note 180, at 1 21.
187. Id. at Annex A.
188. Id. at Annex B.
189. Id. at 1 1. See also Financial Services Act 2010 § 2.
190. COUNCIL FOR FIN. STABILITY, DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE, supra note 180, at 1. The FSA is to
have regard to: (a) the economic and fiscal consequences for the U.K of instability of the U.K financial
system; (b) the effects (if any) on the growth of the economy of the U.K or of anything done for the purpose
of meeting that objective; and (c) the impacts (if any) on the stability of the U.K financial system of events or
circumstances outside the U.K
191. COUNCIL FOR FIN. STABILITY, DRAFr TERMS OF REFERENCE, supra note 180, at 1 1.
192. Financial Services Bill 2009, H.L. Bill 161 (U.K); Financial Services Act 2010 § 2.
193. Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. (2009).
194. Financial Services Act 2010 § 2 (inserting new § 6A(1)(a) FSMA 2000).
195. The consumer financial education function includes: (a) promoting awareness of the benefits of finan-
cial planning; (b) promoting awareness of the financial advantages and disadvantages of the supply of particu-
lar goods or services; (c) promoting awareness of the benefits and risks associated with different types of
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While a new consumer financial education body is to be established, this is to be set up
and managed under the direction of the FSA.196 The FSA will appoint the Chair, Chief
Executive, and Board of the new CFEB.' 97 The FSA will approve the CFEB's annual
budget and annual plan.'98 It will issue rules for the collection of fees from FSA regulated
firms to cover its establishment and running costs.'99 Levies will also be charged from
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) licensed firms.200
The FSA is to be closely involved, although this is an interesting although arguably
unnecessary initiative. The FSA had developed a worldwide reputation for the lead it had
taken in the consumer education and financial capability area. Setting up a new body may
only dilute the effectiveness of the work already carried out by the FSA with the new
agency not being able to deliver comparable successes in future.
C. ExEcuTIVE REMUNERATION
The Act gives the Treasury power to issue regulations concerning the preparation, ap-
proval, and disclosure of executives' remuneration reports, with the FSA required to issue
rules requiring every authorized person to operate in accordance with a set remuneration
policy. 201 The Treasury regulations will require the production of reports disclosing in-
formation on the remuneration amounts paid to officers and employees of authorized per-
sons under the FSMA.202 This disclosure supplements the information already provided
in Directors' Remuneration Reports for Quoted Companies. 203 The provisions effectively
only extend the existing powers to include non-quoted companies and non-board
employees.
The FSA is to issue general rules concerning the production and compliance with inter-
nal remuneration policies. 204 These apply to the payment of benefits to officers, employ-
ees and other persons of a specified description. 205 Remuneration policies must be
consistent with the effective management of risks and the Implementation Standards is-
sued by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in September 2009.206 The FSA may require
remuneration policies to be revised. The FSA may also prohibit persons or specified per-
sons from being remunerated in specified ways, declare any contrary provisions void, and
financial dealing; (d) publication of educational material of the carrying on of educational activity; and (e) the
provision of information and advice to members of the public. Financial Services Act 2010, § 2 and new
§6A(2) FSMA 2000.
196. Financial Services Act 2010 § 2.




201. Id. 1 4(1).
202. Id. 1 4(2).
203. Id. Regulations on directors' remuneration reports are provided for under Section 421 of the Compa-
nies Act 2008 and Schedule 8 to the Large and Medium-Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Re-
ports) Regulations 2008 (S12008/410). This includes disclosure of comparative information including the
ratio between the highest and lowest paid members of staff.
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permit recovery of any payments made under an avoided provision. 207 These measures
fall far short of the power to "rip up" bonus packages referred to in the press.
Remuneration practices can be improved, although this will take time especially with
the contractual obstacles already in place. A number of measures have already been
adopted by many of the major financial groups. Many of the recommendations issued by
the FSA in its Code of Practice and the FSB and other bodies simply reflect market
practice.
Particularly sensitive issues arise with regard to institutions receiving central bank or
government support. Reasonable and proportionate bonus payments must nevertheless be
continued to be made to retain quality staff. Boards and remuneration committees must
be given a certain degree of judgment in determining what payments are appropriate and
those that are excessive in particular circumstances. Such matters will be discussed with
government shareholding agencies involved including, for example, the U.K. Financial
Investment. A blanket ban on bonus payments cannot be supported on an economic,
competition, or legal basis.
D. RESOLUTION AND RECOVERY
The FSA is to be required to make general rules concerning the preparation of recovery
and resolution plans (Living Wills) by authorized persons. 208 The Bill contains provision
for the issuance of separate recovery and resolution plans with recovery dealing with con-
tinuity planning and resolution with business failure. 209 The purpose of a recovery plan is
to reduce the likelihood of failure by specifying the action that would be taken in the event
of stress circumstances arising that would affect the ability of the firm to carry on all or
part of its business. This may include restructuring, downsizing, or disposal. Resolution
plans are to specify the action to be taken when a firm is likely to fail or in the event of
failure. 210
These are important initiatives, which reflect other international proposals for the es-
tablishment of living wills by financial institutions. It is interesting that the U.K. legisla-
tion provides for the preparation of separate recovery (rehabilitation) and resolution
(failure) scenarios. It may be more effective to deal with these together, especially as reso-
lution will include post-event but pre-closure trading difficulty during which recovery
plans would also apply. It may be that integrated recovery and resolution plans (RRPs)
will be prepared in practice. Further guidance will be issued by the FSA in due course on
the content of such RRPs. This single clause (which inserts five new connected sections
within the FSMA) was possibly one of the more important provisions of the Bill.
The FSA is given a separate power (rather than obligation) to issue rules concerning the
prohibition of short selling in particular circumstances. 211 Short selling is a legitimate
trading practice that assists determining the most accurate price for shares and can pro-
mote market liquidity. Short selling can nevertheless be used to drive the price of shares
207. Id.
208. Id. 1 7 (inserting new § 139B FSMA 2000).
209. Id. 1 7.
210. Id. This will include assisting authorities and insolvency officials manage a firm's winding-up including
the establishment of 'data rooms' to collect and distribute information effectively.
211. Id. T 8 (inserting new § 131B FSMA 2000).
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in financial institutions down with the short sellers profiting from the forced price col-
lapse. This may then be considered to amount to a form of market abuse or market
manipulation. 212 It may also increase market instability by undermining confidence in
financial institution stock. This creates a form of investment "run" parallel to a bank run.
Many short sellers were considered to have contributed to share price collapse during the
financial crisis of such institutions as IBOS and then RBS in the United Kingdom and
Lehman Brothers and other major Wall Street investment houses, Merrill Lynch, Morgan
Stanley, and Goldman Sachs. Temporary bans were introduced in the United Kingdom
and United States following share price collapses although not until after the acquisition
of HBOS by Lloyds. 213
E. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND CONSUMER REDRESS
The original Bill attempted to strengthen collection action procedures in the United
Kingdom, although these also had to be dropped from the final Act. This would have
applied where large groups of consumers suffered loss following the conduct of specific
regulated firms or groups of firms. 2 14 The Treasury July 2009 paper refers to such in-
stances as the miss-selling of endowment policies, personal pensions, split capital invest-
ment trusts, precipice bonds, and payment protection insurance. 215 Procedures already
exist for taking forward generic claims on a collective basis including through group litiga-
tion orders under Civil Procedure Rules. A number of difficulties nevertheless arise which
have been highlighted by the Civil Justice Council (CJC).216 The European Commission
has also issued a consultation paper on collection action. 217
The Bill would have given the court power to authorize collective proceedings to be
brought by a representative in respect of a group of financial services claims. 218 The rep-
resentative is not required to have any direct interest in the claim. 219 Collective proceed-
ings mean proceedings brought by the representative on behalf of persons entitled to
bring or who have already commenced specific proceedings in respect of the claim.220
The court will issue a collective proceedings order. Proceedings either will be on an opt-
in or opt-out basis. The court will determine whether its judgment or order will bind
representative persons and which representative persons. 221
The 2010 Act does contain an additional provision with regard to consumer redress
schemes. Firms may be required by the FSA to conduct a review of past business activities
and pay compensation to consumers under Section 404 FSMA.222 Revised provisions in-
212. Id.
213. FSA Introduces Short-Selling Ban, BBC, Sept. 19, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/
7624012.stm.
214. Financial Services Bill 2009 18-25.
215. Reforming Financial Markets, supra note 3, at $ 8.62.
216. Improving Access to justice Through Collective Actions, CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, Nov. 2008, http://www.
civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/filesf/mprovingAccess-tojustice-through-Collectve.Actions.pdf.
217. Commission Consultation Paper for Discussion on the Follow-Up to the Green Paper on Consumer Collective
Redress, COM (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redressscons/collective redressen.htm.
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clude replacing the existing section 404 and inserting new sections 404a-g.223 The FSA
may make consumer redress rules where there has been widespread or regular failure to
comply with the relevant requirements, legally recoverable consumer loss, and it is desira-
ble to secure redress in the particular case. 224
F. DIscIPLNE AND INFORMATION
FSA enforcement powers are strengthened. The FSA may suspend, limit, or otherwise
restrict unauthorized person's permission for up to twelve months under a new Section
206a FSMA. 225 This applies to breaches of any provision applied under the FSMA or a
directly applicable E.U. regulation. The FSA may impose a penalty and withdraw author-
ization in respect of the same breach with the withdrawal of the earlier restriction con-
tained in Section 206(2) FSMA. 226 The FSA may impose a financial penalty on a person
where the person has carried out a controlled function without approval unless they did
not know or could not reasonably have been expected to have known that they were acting
without approval. 227 There was previously no sanction for this. The FSA may also sus-
pend an approved person from carrying on certain functions or impose restrictions on
those functions for up to two years. 228
FSA is provided with new powers to collect specified information relating to financial
stability issues. The Treasury may also require the Financial Services Compensation
Scheme (FSCS) to contribute to the costs of stabilization powers under a special resolu-
tion regime.229 This will be limited to the amount of compensation that the FSCS would
otherwise have had to pay to depositors if the bank had become insolvent, less recov-
eries. 230 Interest costs may be included within the calculation of expenses. 231
VII. U.K. Policy Comment
A number of provisional observations may be made with regard to the evolving U.K.
regulatory policy and reform during the crisis and in the post-crisis period.
A. NORTHERN ROCK
The early phase of the U.K. crisis was dominated by the ad hoc attempts to rescue
Northern Rock by essentially uncoordinated and untested Tripartite group arrangements.
The Bank of England appeared to be hesitant and confused following the leak by the BBC
that Northern Rock required emergency funding. Whether the Bank received incorrect
legal advice on the legality of providing support under E.U. and U.K. law, 232 it had cer-
223. Id
224. Id.
225. Id. 1 9.
226. Id. 1 10.
227. Id. 1 11.
228. Id.
229. Id. 1 16.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Walker, Credit Crisis-Regulatory and Financial Systems Reform, supra note 1, at 570.
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tainly failed to ensure that it had all of the necessary powers to act in the event of a major
crisis arising. Public and private institutions must ensure that they have clear mandates
and the organizational and personnel resources, as well as proper legal powers to dis-
charge them. Where powers are limited or deficient, this deficiency must be corrected
before, and not after, a major crisis arises.
B. TiUPARifE SysTEm
Difficulties also appeared to have arisen with regard to the effectiveness of the inter-
authority cooperation arrangements set up under Tripartite MOU.233 These difficulties
may nevertheless have been attributed to the conflicting advice received or to the person-
alities involved rather than the nature of the mechanism itself. Despite earlier assurances
that the Tripartite arrangements would be maintained, the government had decided by
summer 2009 to replace the earlier informal Tripartite Standing Committee and MOU
with a statutory-based Council for Financial Stability (CFS) and formal terms of agree-
ment and engagement. 234 This decision may have been made more for political rather
than regulatory reasons, as the specific legal status of the new cooperation mechanism may
be largely irrelevant in practice. Of more importance will be ensuring that it has a clear
mandate and proper operational procedures and powers with all of the necessary staff and
resources to carry out its functions. The government may have felt compelled to create a
formal Council with the parallel initiatives being taken forward with the establishment of
a Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC) in the United StateS235 and the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the E.U.236 The fate of the proposed new U.K. CFS will
now depend upon the outcome of the general election.
C. EARLY POLICY FORMULATION
The initial policy statements issued by the Tripartite authorities in October 2007, Janu-
ary, July, and September 2008, were only loosely formulated and insubstantial in terms of
regulatory and supervisory reform. The original objectives of confidence, transparency,
critical banking functions, competition, and taxpayer interest were later reformulated as
strengthening stability and resilience, reducing the occurrence of failure and impact of
failure, effective depositor compensation, and strengthened coordination between the rel-
evant authorities. A more valuable listing of necessary reforms was attached to the July
2008 paper on Financial Stability and Depositor Protection, which also anticipated the crea-
tion of the FSC within the Bank of England. 237 A number of useful papers were also
published by the House of Commons, Treasury Committee, and subsequently by two
House of Lords Committees on various matters including Northern Rock, bank supervi-
233. Id. at 571-72.
234. HOUSE OF COMMONS Commf., FINANcIAL SERVICEs BILL, REPORT, 2009-10, H.C. 10-4, at 4.
235. Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126.
236. Memorandum from the European Council, New Financial Supervision Architecture: Q&A on the Eu-
ropean Systemic Risk Board/The Macro-Supervision Part of the Package (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://
europa.cu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/405&format=HTML&aged=0&languge=
EN&guiLanguage=en.
237. HM TREASURY, FINANcIAL STABILITY AND DEPOSITOR PROTECTION (2008), available at http-/
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/financial-stability-depositor.htm.
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sion and regulatory reform, Icelandic banks and U.K. depositor protection, remuneration
practice, European institutional arrangements, and most recently "too big to fail." 238
These papers provided important factual background on many aspects of crisis and as-
sisted confirmation of policy directions, although their contribution in terms of substan-
tive reform was more limited.
D. BANK RESOLUTION
The most significant early success was made in designing and bringing into effect the
new Special Resolution Regime (SRR), initially under the Banking (Special Provisions)
Act 2008 and then the Banking Act 2009 on a permanent basis.239 This regime created a
comprehensive set of resolution mechanisms in the event of a major banking or other
depository institution facing crisis. SRR options now include a private sector purchase,
temporary private transfer (bridge bank on a U.S. model) or public ownership (nationali-
zation) with revised bank administration (BAP), and bank insolvency procedures (BIP).240
A series of additional protections then had to be brought into effect with the retroactive
amendment ("Henry VII"), transfer without restriction, transferee continuity, contractual
displacement (or default disregard), group continuity, and pensions and tax adjustment
clauses.241 These protections were intended to facilitate any restructuring, especially at
short notice and possibly within a limited geographic area, although these substantially
interfere with private property and contractual rights.
Legal protections for contractual netting, set-off, collateral, and other measures had to
be brought into effect under the Safeguards instruments, which effectively reverses the
presumption of proper private contractual enforcement and validity. These measures can
be defended based on financial stability, the need to reinforce market discipline, and re-
duce moral hazard. They may nevertheless still constitute substantial interferences with
private contractual rights and remedies and are contrary to the open liberal market culture
of the City of London and the common law legal system. To what extent they may under-
mine continuing investment in bank stock and private bank capital remains to be seen.
This protection may also have the unintended effect of requiring the government to hold
on to its interests in LBG and RBS for considerably longer than intended.
E. TURNER REvIEW
The intellectual content of the U.K. policy debate was re-set with the publication of the
Turner Review in March 2009, and later speeches by Lord Turner and other senior FSA
officials. The review confirmed the need for the adoption of a systemic approach to bank
regulation, a cyclic understanding of economic functions, strengthened capital and liquid-
ity reserves, European branch passport review, and a new approach to macro-prudential
238. Econ. Affairs Comm., Banking Supervision and Regulation, HOUSE OF LORDS, 2009, H.L. 101, supra
note 39; European Union Comm., The Future of EU Financial Regulation and Supervision, HOUSE OF LORDS,
2009, H.L. 106, supra note 39; Treasury Comm., Proposals for European Financial Supervision: Further Report,
HOUSE OF COMMONS, 2009, HC 37, supra note 39.
239. Banking Special Provisions Act, 2008, c.2; Banking Act, 2009, c.1.
240. Banking Act, 2009, pt. 1.
241. Id.
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supervision. 242 The Treasury White Paper of July 2009 largely endorses the principal
regulatory and supervisory recommendations made by Turner with much of this approach
being dependent on separate agreement being achieved elsewhere at the E.U. and interna-
tional technical committee levels. 243 Many of the post-crisis reform papers issued operate
on this "regulatory delegation" basis with only limited substantial reform being taken for-
ward immediately.
Wider issues were also raised in the Turner Review with regard to possible product
regulation, counter-cyclical capital tools, and credit supply; although no firm conclusions
were fortunately drawn in these areas, which will allow further reflection and debate on
these more controversial issues.244 The Treasury White Paper is also of value in clarifying
that consumer protection and competition law issues arise, although it conveniently ig-
nores the damage that aggressive competition can create in reducing regulatory standards,
such as where new market entrants (such as Northern Rock) with lower cost burdens
compete with more established operators by offering high loan to value (LTV) sell-certifi-
cation and mortgages, or other "teaser" products (below) and effectively drive down regu-
latory and market standards. 245 These issues will be considered by the new Consumer
Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) in the United States and by the FSA or new con-
sumer financial education body (CFEB) in the United Kingdom.
F. CAPITAL AND LIQUIDYTY
The need to strengthen capital cannot be refuted, although Lord Turner's statement, in
his review, that consensus already exists on the need for counter-cyclical capital charging
overstates the argument. Counter-cyclical charging is complex, costly, possibly contradic-
tory, difficult to apply (especially in identifying switching or reversal of asset price move-
ments in the economic cycle), and possibly simply confused (with no segregation of
assigned capital to act as a buffer during the downturn).
Capital adequacy can be strengthened far more simply and cost effectively by raising
core tier one levels under existing powers of national regulatory discretion. This capital
can then be supported by the use of other convertible capital items either within tier one
(including preferred stock) or tier two (with equity convertible debentures or subordinated
debt). It is understood that complex counter-cyclical capital charging would only raise
capital levels by up to two or three percent, while this could be achieved much more easily
and efficiently by simply raising the core tier one levels across the cycle. The continued
references to higher buffers to cover miscreant losses in the event of an unidentified and
undefined down turn in the cycle are also almost meaningless without some segregation,
which is not provided for under current models. The Spanish model, which is often re-
ferred to, is principally concerned with loss provisioning rather than capital directly.246
242. Turner Review, supra note 2.
243. Reforming Financial Markets, supra note 3.
244. Turner Review, supra note 2.
245. Reforming Financial Markets, supra note 3.
246. Letter from Dr. Claire Stone, ACA, The Institute of Chartered Accountants, to European Commis-
sion, Requests for Comments on Possible Further Changes to the Capital Requirements Directive (Sept. 4,
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The FSA's Supervisory Enhancement Program (SEP) is to be fully supported following
Northern Rock as well as its core proposals on strengthening liquidity oversight. 247 Care
must nevertheless be exercised to ensure that disproportionate costs are not simply im-
posed on banks or U.K. based banks placed at any significant competitive disadvantage
with all of the additional information being reported never being properly used by the
authorities. This would only increase regulatory cost at the expense of financial services
customers with no direct or appreciable regulatory benefit.
G. GOVERNANCE
The principal recommendations of the Walker Review of Corporate Governance are
also to be welcomed, especially with regard to board composition and qualifications, en-
hanced non-executive director role, risk oversight and performance evaluation, govern-
ance, and remuneration. 248 The most useful proposals relate to creating a new culture of
risk oversight at the highest level within banks and the promotion of executive challenge
with strengthened NED and NEDCo functions. 249 To what extent fund managers and
other professional or institutional investors will subscribe to the separate recommenda-
tions made with regard to their assumption of a more direct disciplinary role, including
publication of their commitment and policies in this regard, nevertheless remains to be
seen. This specific set of proposals may only amount to regulatory "wishful thinking" in
practice.
The decision to leave remuneration decisions to bank boards and market practice is to
be fully supported. The FSA has already confirmed its general requirement that all firms
must maintain policies that support effective risk management with the ten principles set
out in its final Remuneration Code of Practice issued on August 12, 2009.250 This re-
quirement is now further strengthened with the additional recommendations set out in
the Walker Review with regard to oversight, high-end remuneration, deferrals, perform-
ance conditions, and possible clawback.251 Concerns may only arise with regard to the
Walker five-year deferral period, which may be considered too long by some groups and
have to be shortened in particular cases (to around three years). Package composition
requirements including options and disposals are all already dealt with within the FSA
guidelines. 252
The residual issue is then with regard to providing clear board guidance on actual pack-
age terms and conditions. The Walker Review contained no empirical data on the extent
247. HousE OF COMMONS COMM., FINANCIAL SERVICES BILL, REPORT, 2009-10, H.C. 10-4, at 1.
248. WALKER REVIEw, supra note 4.
249. Id. at 28.
250. FIN. SERVICES AuTH., FINAL REMUNERATION CODE OF PRACTICE (2009) (The final Code measures
dilute earlier recommendations such as two thirds of each bonus should be deferred and that individual re-
wards should into account the overall performance of a firm rather than that of the individual or division
alone. It was reported that the U.K. FSA was frustrated that there was less consensus than had been hoped
with other agencies.). See also Brooke Masters and Patrick Jenkins, FSA Steps Back from PAY Rules for Banks,
FIN. TIMos, Aug. 11, 2009, at 1. The U.S. Financial Remuneration Bill has also been brought forward
although this again leaves individual packages to be negotiated at bank level with the systemic implications of
remuneration more generally being considered by the new Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC).
251. WALKER REVIEW, supra note 4.
252. FINAL REMUNERATION CODE OF PRACTICE.
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to which contractually agreed remuneration practices had significantly contributed to
causing the crisis (which many commentators have simply assumed) and provided no assis-
tance in determining how to assess specific package amounts. The confidentiality that
surrounds the issue makes it even more difficult in practice. The U.K. Treasury Minster
Lord Myners had called for transparency on recipients, although this still avoids the is-
sue.253 New guidance should be issued that provides remuneration boards with a number
of payment options and ranges (including ratios or other calculation mechanisms) to allow
them to negotiate with senior managers and traders in a meaningful and responsible man-
ner and to avoid endless "Groupthink" and the constant ratcheting up of packages. 254
While profit percentages may continue to be used, ceilings should be considered tied to
multiples of basic salary. Excess bonus pool amounts not distributed in any one year
should be retained for subsequent years or simply used to support pension or health insur-
ance provision across the institution as a whole. Former RBS CEO Sir Fred Goodwin's
package should have been examined and negotiated at the time when it was initially agreed
by the board and then later by the government, and not subsequently in the press after it
was contractually immune from revision.
H. TREASURY WHITE PAPER
The Treasury White Paper separately restated the need for financial firms to re-estab-
lish a relationship of trust with their clients.255 The paper confirms that a number of
specific initiatives have been taken forward in the United Kingdom specifically following
the crisis, as well as part of the larger financial capability program in connection with
which the FSA had become a world leader. 256 Consumer education is one of the FSA's
core statutory objectives as set out in the FSMA. This initiative is also closely related to
maintaining market confidence, which is the first of the FSA's statutory regulatory objec-
tives as set out in the FSMA. 257 This requirement extends to both retail and wholesale
counterparties, with the FSA having already interpreted it to include financial stability,
although it will also now have an additional express financial stability function under the
Financial Services Act 2010.258 Not including financial stability as a proper and legiti-
mate, if not principal, statutory objective was one of the main mistakes that the drafters
253. GILuAN TETT, FOOL's GOLD 135 (2009) (Jamie Dimon caused considerable surprise after he took
over as CEO and President atJP Morgan Chase in 2004 when he required that the payment terms of the 300
senior managers were disclosed for the first time internally and introduced standard contracts without special
side deals.).
254. New remuneration rules may include (a) specifying the basic purpose of remuneration packages (such as
provide pay for basic service provided, incentivise hard work and reward significant contributions to the firm);
(b) recalibrate all basic salaries; (c) sue multiples of salary for reward; (d) retain percentage payments but
impose ceilings (such as up to ten times basic salary); (e) impose a 'value added' test to confirm contribution
to rear special terms; (0 impose further 'no risk' test to confirm no increase in firm risk exposure; (g) maxi-
mum disclosure and transparency; (h) shareholder vote on payments on all discretionary or special packages
(possibly with continued executive override but only on cause with further rights of unanimous veto); (i)
separate risk assessment on overall firm payment packages as a whole; (j) regulatory report on packages and
risk assessment; (k) right of regulatory response; (1) capital penalties if necessary; and (m) the provision of
trade association recommended guidelines in all key sectors.
255. FINAL REAINERATION CODE OF PRACTCE, CM. 7667.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Financial Services Act 2010 § 1.
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made in preparing the original FSMA terms, which is otherwise generally regarded as
being an excellent piece of regulatory drafting. The Financial Services Act also contains
other important provisions with regard to financial stability, remuneration, recovery and
resolution, and redress, and strengthening of other enforcement and recovery schemes but
with regard to the proposed CFS and not on collective action. 259
I. COMPETrITON
The White Paper was separately useful in confirming the importance of competition
and the need to maintain open and efficient markets, although it omitted referring to the
damage that excessive competition can cause if it is not properly balanced with other ap-
propriate regulatory measures.260 The authorities must be sensitive to the difficulties that
unregulated competition can create, such as through reducing regulatory and market stan-
dards (as with offering high LIV loans to unsuitable borrowers in both sub-prime and
prime markets) 261,or creating high levels of concentration and dominant positions (as with
the Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) in the United Kingdom). Competition policy must be
balanced with financial stability and other protection objectives. This policy also raises
the wider issue, referred to in the Turner Review, of the extent to which authorities should
attempt to regulate innovation and welfare benefit directly. Despite Lord Turner's invita-
tion to do so, this policy must be resisted unless any separate risk management or conse-
quent financial stability difficulty arises. Other consumer protection concerns should be
principally dealt with through disclosure and financial capability rather than direct finan-
cial regulation.
J. INsTIrriONAL REVISION
The institutional structure of regulation has been reconsidered in many countries. This
reconsideration includes the earlier aborted Hank Paulson recommendations in the
United States that were subsequently replaced by the more moderate Treasury proposals
under Tim Geithner in the June 2009 New Foundation paper. 262 The continuing principal
objective must be to clarify regulatory function and responsibility at the same time as
avoiding debilitating conflicts ("turf wars") and ensuring full regulatory coverage of all
institutions that may create any systemic risk. The U.S. Treasury's original 2009 plans
allowed for only limited simplification of the regulatory net (with the merger of the OTS
and OCC within the Treasury), although they do represent an intelligent political com-
promise that may not otherwise have received necessary Congressional approval. 263
Whether and in what form the plans may finally be adopted remains unclear, especially
with all of the other significant reform measures before Congress demanding legislative
time.
259. See id. § 6-7.
260. FINAL REMUNERATION CODE OF PRACTICE, CM. 7667.
261. Id. pt. E.
262. DEVr. OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGUIATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING Fi-
NANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), available at http-J/www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs
FinalReport.web.pdf.
263. Cheyenne Hopkins, Treasury Proposal Would Combine Federal Bank, Tbrift Credit Union Charters, Am.
BANKER, Mar. 31, 2008, httpi/www.americanbanker.com/issues/173_61/-348602-1.htmL.
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The U.K. government has confirmed that it supports the single integrated regulatory
structure set up under the FSMA although the Conservative opposition publicly an-
nounced in July 2009 that it would transfer regulatory function to a strengthened Bank of
England and restructure the FSA as a more limited consumer protection agency.2 64 This
proposal was somewhat surprisingly supported by The Economist. The main omission with
these proposals is simply that while bank and insurance company supervision would be
transferred back to the Bank of England under the Conservative plans, the crisis was not
caused by the banking markets specifically, but by the unregulated mortgage sales markets
in the United States and the excesses in the structured finance departments of the major
investment houses on Wall Street and elsewhere that carry out securities business and not
deposit taking (banking) under U.S. and U.K. laws. The British Conservative proposals
are almost silent on securities and market regulation. It is also arguable that wholesale
money and capital markets have become so integrated and inter-connected in recent times
that they should be regulated together insofar as possible with any moves to break up an
already integrated oversight regime under the FSMA being regressive and ill-informed.
Of more importance in terms of institutional reform has been the creation of new
multi-agency financial stability oversight entities. These include the U.S. Financial Ser-
vices Oversight Council (FSOC), the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the U.K.
Council for Financial Stability (CFS), as well as the new separate Financial Stability Sub-
committee (FSC) within the Bank of England. The role and function of the U.K. FSC
has since been clarified in the Financial Services Bill.265 The international FSF was also
formally re-designated the Financial Stability Board (FSB) following the London G20
Summit.266 This focus on "systemic" (in the language of the Treasury White Paper) or
"macro-prudential" oversight (under the Turner Review) is to be fully supported as it was
one of the core official pre-crisis failures that arose.
K. FINANCIAL STABILITY AND MARKET SUPPORT
Substantial difficulties nevertheless remain in developing any meaningful financial sta-
bility policy in practice. Separate work streams are, for example, being taken forward
within the IMF and the Bank of England with this issue also being considered by the FSB
and by the BIS in its recent Annual Reports. 267 Many measures and indicators have to be
taken into account in initially identifying potential vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities
have to be assessed and prioritized, which can only be regarded as a matter of judgment.
Effective tools must then be made available to attempt to give effect to any intervention
264. Turner Review, supra note 2.
265. FINANCIAL SERVICES BILL, REPORT, 2009-10, H.C. 10-4.
266. History, FIN. STABILITY FORUM, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history.htm.
267. See, e.g., Aerdt Houben, Jan Kakes, & Garry Schinasi, Toward a Framework for Safeguarding Financial
Stability (IMF, Working Paper No. 04/110,2004); Garry Schinasi, Defining Financial Stability (IMF, Working
Paper No. 04/187, 2004); Garry Schinasi, Safeguarding Financial Stability: Theory and Practice (IMF 2006); W.
Allen & G. Wood, Defining and Achieving Financial Stability, 2(2) J. FIN. STABILIFY 152-72 (2006); IMF,
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILnrY REPORT: CorrTAINrING SYSTEMIC RISKS AND RESTORING FINANCIAL
SOUNDNESs, Executive Summary ix, (Apr. 2008). See also Andrew Haldane, et.al., Financial Stability Review:
Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Models' Bank of England, BANic oF ENG. (June 2004); Andrew Haldane et.
al., Financial Stability Paper No. 2: A New Approach to Assessing Risk to Financial Stability, BANK OF ENG. (Apr.
2007).
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decisions agreed. Unfortunately, only limited options have been identified at this stage
(including higher and counter-cyclical capital charging or interest rates), although these
may have other distortional and contradictory or conflicting effects. A key issue not re-
ferred to in any of the papers to date also appears to be the need to attempt to balance
regulatory with monetary, economic, fiscal, competition, and other consumer protection
policies.
The Bank of England issued an important recent discussion paper on The Role ofMacro-
Prudential Policy in November 2009.268 This study assesses how risk across the financial
system as a whole (referred to as systemic risk) can be dealt with through a "reorientation"
of prudential regulation and prudential regulatory tools. 269 The paper reviews the role
and function of monetary policy in modem markets and defines systemic risk is in terms of
aggregate (cycle) and network (connectivity) effects.270 Market failure is defined in terms
of lack of effective incentives, information, and co-ordination with the primary exposure
propagation channels being leverage (solvency) and maturity transformation (liquidity).271
This is an important paper in providing a first full and substantial study of the meaning
of the financial stability and some of the main means of managing it in practice. The
unfortunate, but almost inevitable, conclusion drawn is nevertheless that more traditional
monetary policy tools, including principally interest rates, are not suitable for controlling
systemic risk. The authorities are then forced to rely on a further level of counter-cyclical
capital charging, managed through the central bank or other systemic regulator, in addi-
tion to all of the other "Basel In" higher capital charges to be implemented by the finan-
cial regulator at the micro level. Banks will then be subject to substantial parallel and
supplementary new micro and macro capital supplements in addition to the bonus and
other penalty taxes already announced in the United States, United Kingdom, and else-
where, as well as the proposed new global financial stability levy recently supported by the
IMF.272 All of this may simply destroy the underlying credit intermediation process or, at
minimum, substantially limit the amount and increase the cost of credit available to com-
panies and households. Difficult issues still remain to be resolved in this area.
Effective support mechanisms must also be set up in all countries. These mechanisms
must operate based on a combination of individual institution liquidity support, capital
support, guarantee support, possible asset purchase, and direct credit (quantitative easing)
where necessary. Where the government acquires a stake in private financial institution, it
should be returned to the market as soon as possible. Financial institutions should be
made as robust as possible, including maintaining effective contingency planning, as well
as winding-up policies in the event of their own closure. Market confidence is neverthe-
less ultimately dependent on the availability of necessary official support arrangements in
the event of a major crisis. The provision of market support is an issue on which regula-
tors and regulatory reform papers have become almost silent. Financial institutions must
be substantially strengthened especially in terms of capital, liquidity, and governance, al-
268. Press Release, Bank of Eng., The Role of Macro-Prudential Policy (Nov. 21 2009), available at http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2009/11 1han.
269. Id. The Bank does not provide any specific definition of macro-prudential policy.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, Apr. 2010, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/01/
pdf/chapl.pdf.
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though market confidence is ultimately dependent on effective market support and only
on official market support.
L. POLICY CONFLICT
The two residual issues that remain to be resolved are then concerned with welfare
balance and allocation of market support costs. Market cycles are natural processes and
maximum welfare benefit will only arise where economies can grow and expand in as
unrestricted a manner as possible. The objective should not be to attempt to remove
natural cycles, but only to limit their more damaging extremes and the more debilitating
effects of any downturns, and, in particular, prevent any more severe crashes or crises as
experienced over the last two years.
In the event of a major crisis, the authorities must be willing and able to take all neces-
sary action to prevent the most devastating consequences through extended lender of last
resort and other support operations. An official contingent support liability or responsi-
bility arises in all cases and appropriate arrangements must be in place for this purpose.
This support is essential to maintain market confidence in all extreme cases, although it
necessarily involves an allocation of cost between the public and private sectors through
financial support and financial regulation.
Modern economies ultimately depend on achieving the most appropriate balance be-
tween allowing open competitive markets (and natural and moderate cycles) to evolve at
the same time as imposing necessary costs and obligations on market operators to ensure
their stability, and at the same time protecting the stable and efficient operation of the
markets as a whole. Excessive or distortional regulatory costs must be avoided where
these only limit credit supply, growth, and welfare benefit, although these must also be set
against the potentially unlimited liability of the state in making support available in all
necessary cases. The objective of modern financial regulation must then be to find a new
balance between innovation and credit supply with stable private financial institutions and
private capital markets being secured at low public cost.
VIII. U.K. Policy Conclusions
The global financial crisis was a complex event. It is impossible to identify any single
cause, fault, or blame, despite the more hysterical press and media attempts to do so. A
large number of factors came together to create the underlying conditions within which
markets became increasingly vulnerable and unstable. Once a specific trigger event oc-
curred (and specifically, the Lehman closure), other factors produced contagious and cyc-
lic effects with others aggravating and magnifying the damage and contraction caused.
Complex problems require carefully considered, informed, and appropriately balanced
composite solutions.
A significant number of studies and papers have been issued on the crisis with an even
larger number of opinions and recommendations made for reform. Many common ele-
ments arise, although care still must be exercised where regulators claim that there is clear
consensus on certain matters (such as counter-cyclical capital charging) where this only
reflects their own opinion, preference, or negotiating position. Many of the recommenda-
tions also simply operate on a delegated or postponed basis by instructing, directing, or
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simply transferring responsibility to another agency or technical committees to take the
matter covered forward. Many of the issues raised are highly complex and sensitive, and it
may take some time before any meaningful understanding and agreement can be secured.
Initial regulatory delegation may then simply be followed by regulatory delay (dispute or
disagreement) and eventual regulatory compromise (gap or omission). The danger is to
avoid replacing earlier irrational market exuberance with an even more irrational and
equally damaging official or regulatory over-reaction.
The emerging U.K. response is essentially based on an as yet unspecified increase in
total capital and liquidity levels, enhanced supervision and enforcement, strengthened cor-
porate governance within bank boards, including more careful oversight of remuneration
packages (based on risk assessment, deferral, performance conditions, and possible
clawback), a new special resolution (SRR) regime with strengthened deposit protection,
and the proposed creation of a new Council for Financial Stability (CFS) to manage sys-
temic oversight. This response can then be summarized in terms of reserves, governance,
resolution, compensation, and macro-prudential supervision. The main gap in the United
Kingdom remains effective market support with any further central bank capital or fund-
ing arrangements being left to be managed by the Bank of England as part of the revision
of its Red Book. This particular response is inadequate and a major omission as both
market and consumer confidence are ultimately dependent on effective support in the
most extreme crisis.
The residual difficulty that all countries and other agencies will have to resolve is how
to manage macro-prudential financial stability going forward. The necessary solution re-
mains an unclear, unspecified, and an untested area. An effective macro-prudential or
systemic stability policy will have to be constructed with all necessary and relevant indica-
tors being taken into account and appropriate implementation tools being made available
to give this effect in practice. National policy and target or strategy conflicts will have to
be resolved, while much more substantial cooperation and coordination will have to be
achieved at the regional and international levels. This resolution will specifically involve
balancing a number of possibly conflicting policy objectives. Market stability is ultimately
dependent on strong regulatory policy with effective monetary policy, economic policy,
fiscal economy, and competition or consumer policy. Meaningful policy integration must
also then be achieved from a national, regional, and global perspective. This remains a
significant challenge still to be resolved.
We have lived through the most devastating and debilitating crisis for many years. The
extended Great Moderation and Great Stability that everyone benefited from came to an
abrupt and severe end in summer 2007. This crisis has nevertheless created an equally
significant opportunity to reconsider fundamental issues with regard to the structure and
operation of modern financial markets, financial market control, and financial benefit. It
also has to be expected that the crisis may have been even worse if its correction had been
delayed even longer. Official policy has since then moved away from unrestricted open
liberal markets to a more constrained and directed environment, although this issue was
always only a question of balance. It must not be forgotten that massive benefits were
experienced during the extended period of financial stability and economic growth that
almost all countries enjoyed over the last two and a half decades. The objective must now
be to pursue future innovation and growth within a new more sophisticated, but not nec-
essarily less flexible or innovative framework, within which all relevant vulnerabilities and
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exposures are taken into account and properly managed and balanced. It may still be
possible to construct a new financial market order that can deliver opportunity and benefit
without the same dangers of destructive future instability and collapse.
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